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FIFTH BRIGADE 
VERRIERES RIDGE 
Terry Copp 
T he Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade arrived in France on 16 July 1944 during the worst 
days of the battle of Normandy. The Allies had 
expected heavy losses on the D-Day beaches 
and then, once through the Atlantic Wall, 
lighter casualties in a war of rapid movement. 
The opposite had happened. The coastal 
defences had been quickly breached, but then 
there were only slow movement and horrendous 
casualties. In one month more than 40,000 
U.S. troops were killed, wounded or missing, 
while almost 38,000 British and Canadian 
troops shared the same fate. The Allied air 
forces enjoyed total air superiority over the 
battlefield, but in June alone the cost was 
6,200 aircrew. Soldiers on both sides were 
beginning to say that it was 1914-1918 all over 
again - a static battle of attrition with gains 
measured in yards and thousands of dead. 
Generals in their memoirs and historians in 
their books on Normandy have usually focused 
attention on controversies over Allied strategy, 
especially the Montgomery-Eisenhower debate, 
but the real problem was at the tactical, not the 
strategic level. It is an axiom of military science 
that the attacker needs a three-to-one margin 
over the defender to have a reasonable chance 
of success. If the defence is well dug in, even 
better odds are required. The Allies had landed 
in Normandy prepared for a war of mobility in 
which the tactical air forces and the armoured 
regiments would dominate the battlefield. 
Instead, they were confronted with a German 
army able to maintain a continuous perimeter 
and a defence in depth. 
Fifth Brigade's introduction to the battlefield 
came on 18 Ju ly as par t of Operation 
"Goodwood," when the Black Watch forced a 
crossing of the Orne opposite the race course 
in Caen. The next morning the Regiment de 
Maisonneuve and the Calgary Highlanders went 
into action and by the evening of the 21st all 
three battalions held positions on the lower 
slope of Verrieres Ridge. On the night of the 
22nd the Maisonneuves were assigned to clear 
the village of Etavaux as part of a British (43rd 
West Riding Division) operation to capture 
Maltot on the west bank of the Orne. The 
Maisonneuves captured Etavaux taking more 
than 100 prisoners from the 272nd Division 
but their own losses were 10 killed, 48 wounded 
and 50 evacuated for battle exhaustion.1 The 
Maisonneuves had lost more than two hundred 
riflemen in just four days of combat and since 
French-speaking reinforcements were in short 
supply they could not be brought back up to 
strength. The Maisies were placed in divisional 
reserve, leaving Fifth Brigade with just two 
battalions for its next operation. 
While the battle for control of Etavaux and 
Maltot was fought, Lieut-General Miles 
Dempsey, the commander of Second British 
Army, met with Guy Simonds, CO of II 
Canadian Corps, to plan a new offensive in the 
Canadian sector. On 21 July Montgomery had 
issued a directive which required II Canadian 
Corps to remain "as active as possible" so that 
the enemy would believe that "we contemplate 
a major advance towards Falaise and Argentan. 
. . . The Germans must," Montgomery wrote, 
"be induced to build up strength east of the 
Orne so our affairs on the western flank can 
proceed with greater speed."2 
This directive is often cited as proof that the 
Canadian assault on Verrieres Ridge, code-
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named "Spring", was planned as a holding 
action to assist the American breakout, 
Operation "Cobra"; but on 22 July Montgomery 
changed his plans. He explained a new scheme 
to Eisenhower in a letter which stated that he 
was not going to "hold back or wait" for the 
Americans. Instead, II Canadian Corps, 
reinforced with two British armoured divisions, 
was to attack on 25 July, capturing Verrieres 
Ridge and advancing south to secure the next 
high ground at Point 122 near Cranmesnil. 
Two days later XII British Corps, west of the 
Orne, would once again try to capture the Hill 
112 area. Once this was accomplished VIII 
Corps, the armoured divisions restored to it, 
would thrust down the road to Falaise. All of 
these operations, described as a series of left-
right-left blows, would culminate in a new 
Goodwood using "three or four armoured 
divisions" to break through to Falaise.3 
Second Canadian Corps was still operating under Second British Army in July. 
S imonds d i s cus sed the deta i l s of the 
operation "fully" with General Dempsey and 
obtained his approval, but "Spring" was 
Simonds' plan.4 He designed it as a three-
phase battle involving the two Canadian 
in fan t ry d iv is ions and 2nd C a n a d i a n 
Armoured Brigade, plus Guards and 7th 
Armoured Divisions. Second Tactical Air 
Force was to devote its full resources to the 
battle and the medium guns of three Army 
Groups Royal Artillery (AGRAs) were to 
supplement eight field regiments. In the first 
phase 3rd Division was to capture Tilly-La-
Campagne while 2nd Division seized May-
sur-Orne and Verrieres village. Phase II 
required 2nd Division to capture Fontenay-
le-Marmion and Rocquancourt while 7th 
Armoured Division attacked Cranmesnil and 
3rd Division assaulted Garcelles-Secqueville. 
These moves were to set the stage for the 
Guards Armoured Division to seize the high 
ground about Cintheaux and the river 
crossings at Bretteville-sur-Laize,5 the same 
objectives listed for the exploitation phase of 
Operation "Goodwood". 
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Allied intelligence on enemy defences in the 
area was limited by poor weather which 
prevented photo-reconnaissance. Prisoners of 
war from the 272nd Division brought news of 
the attempted assassination of Hitler, Order of 
Battle information, and stories of their ten-day 
trek to Normandy from the Spanish border, 
but nothing was learned about the strength or 
location of the battle groups of 9th SS and 2nd 
Panzer Divisions supporting them.6 
Intelligence officers also failed to appreciate 
that 272nd Division had committed two of its 
three regiments to the defence of St. Andre and 
St. Martin. This was the main line of German 
resistance on the left flank and it was held by 
two battalions and elements of two others. The 
division's artillery, anti-tank regiments, scores 
of mortars, and a Nebelwerfer regiment were 
also committed to the defence of the area.7 
Simonds believed that a repetition of the 
daylight attack of 19 July had little chance of 
success so he decided to undertake Phase I in 
full darkness, hoping to be past the first line of 
enemy resistance before daybreak. Since the 
enemy overlooked the area from the west side 
of the Orne as well as the ridge, the troops 
would have to wait until close to midnight 
before beginning to move to their forming up 
places. This meant that H-Hour was delayed to 
0330 hours, leaving less than three hours of 
darkness for Phase I.8 
The Anglo-Canadian forces had very limited 
experience with night attacks. Second Division 
had begun to study the problem in 1943 when 
Major-General E.L.M. Burns was in command. 
A divisional night fighting course offered 
instruction in orientation and controlling 
troops9 but everyone who has been on a night 
exercise in strange country knows how difficult 
it is to keep direction even when no one is 
shooting at you. The British Army's operational 
research group had devised a number of 
navigational aids for nightfighting but their 
focus was on vehicles, not marching troops.10 
Artificial moonlight, searchlights bounced off 
clouds, was the only practical measure available 
to assist infantry. 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 1 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol1/iss1/5
3Copp: Fifth Brigade at Verrieres Ridge
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1992
"Spring" was supposed to involve four 
divisions but most of the troops were assigned 
to the later phases. The night attack involved 
just three battalions, each committing between 
300 and 350 men to the assault. This meant 
that 272nd Division and the Panzer battle 
groups, who were well dug-in with carefully 
p r epa red in te r lock ing fields of fire, 
outnumbered the attackers by a considerable 
margin. The Corps Commander counted on 
darkness and the artillery to overcome these 
odds and get his troops forward. 
S imonds 1 o rde r s left t he divis ional 
commanders with little latitude. H-Hour had 
been determined and both air strikes and the 
medium artillery program of harassing fire on 
known German positions were set. Major-
General Charles Foulkes, the General Officer 
Commanding (GOC) 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division, had to determine quickly how best to 
carry out a divisional attack while two of his 
nine battalions were out of action recovering 
from their mauling in "Atlantic."11 Foulkes 
faced a difficult situation. In theory his troops 
held a line from St. Andre-sur-Orne along the 
road which ran on the lower slope of Verrieres 
through Beauvoir farm to the village of Hubert-
Folie. In practice this was far from the case, 
particularly on the right flank where the 
Camerons had been struggling just to hold on 
to parts of St. Andre. When Fifth Brigade was 
informed that for the first phase of "Spring" the 
St. Andre-Beauvoir road would be the start 
line, Brigadier W.J. Megill, commander of 5 
Brigade, sent two officers to the village to 
prepare a tactical headquarters. They arrived 
without any difficulty but when they opened 
the door of a likely house they heard German 
voices and promptly withdrew. 
Megill decided to go and see the situation for 
himself. The Camerons had lost a number of 
officers in the past few days, including their 
CO, but the acting commander, Major J. 
Muncie, had a good grasp of the situation. He 
told Megill that the Camerons did not control 
most of St. Andre, never mind the adjacent 
village of St. Martin-de-Fontenay.12 The 
Camerons faced continuous mortar fire, 
frequent enemy countera t tacks and the 
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constant infiltration of small groups of enemy 
soldiers. As late as the morning of the 24th a 
patrol of approximately 25 Germans appeared 
in a quarry to the left-rear of battalion 
headquarters. Fortunately a section of the 
Toronto Scottish medium machine guns was 
deployed in the area and the enemy patrol was 
destroyed.13 
Megill went immedia te ly to division 
headquarters to ask to have the Maisonneuves, 
now in divisional reserve, returned to the 
brigade so they could clear the start line for the 
Calgaries. Foulkes refused, insisting that Sixth 
Brigade did hold St. Andre and could clear St. 
Martin. After some acrimonious discussion 
Foulkes agreed to place the Camerons under 
Fifth Brigade to secure the start line.14 The 
Camerons began this task on the night of the 
24th, just hours before "Spring" was to begin. 
"Stiff opposition" was met from the beginning 
and it was necessary to keep reinforcing the 
Camerons' attackforce, which lost three officers 
in the first hour. By midnight the actual start 
line seemed to be quiet.15 This did not mean 
that St. Martin-de-Fontenay had been cleared 
nor had anyone attempted to occupy the factory 
area 300 yards south of the St. Martin church. 
This complex of buildings, with a single 
prominent tower housing machinery for a mine 
shaft, was targetted in the divisional artillery 
plan as part of a rolling barrage which was to 
lead the Calgary Highlanders from their check 
line, the St. Andre-Verrieres road where the 
barrage would begin, to their objective, May-
sur-Orne. The Germans occupied the mine 
workings in strength and maintained well-
concealed pos i t ions t h r o u g h o u t the 
southeastern fringe of St. Martin. 
Foulkes, by retaining the Maisonneuves in 
divisional reserve and assigning the Black 
Watch to Phase II, left Megill with a single 
battalion which had been briefed to advance 
quickly, two companies up, following the 
barrage into May.16 With hindsight it can be 
argued that Megill should have intervened and 
ordered the Calgary Highlanders to use at least 
one company to clear and occupy St. Martin 
and the factory area, though how this change 
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could have been communicated to the Calgaries 
is not immediately apparent. Throughout the 
hours of darkness the battalion was moving 
from Point 67 to their forming up places and 
company commanders were fully taxed keeping 
their men together. A large part of D company, 
including company headquarters, did in fact 
get lost and had to return to Point 67 to re-
orient themselves.17 At the last moment Lieut. -
Colonel Donald MacLaughlan, the Calgary CO, 
did change the plan, ordering one of his reserve 
companies to advance with the barrage to 
protect the right flank of the assault companies. 
MacLaughlan's concern with the wooded areas 
along the River Orne was no doubt justified, 
but this change did not address the problem of 
St. Martin or the factory and left him with only 
the small part of D company which had arrived 
as a reserve.18 
What MacLaughlan called his "main effort" 
force, Major John Campbell's Able company 
and Major Nixon's Charlie company, were lined 
up east of the St. 
Andre-May road. 
Able company on 
the left "discovered 
that the area was 
not clear" and "had 
to fight to get on the 
start line." They hit 
the check line on 
time and swung 
fur ther eas t to 
bypass the factory 
a rea , b u t came 
under small arms 
fire from the eastern 
edge of St. Martin. 
Major Campbel l 
had to choose 
quickly be tween 
detaching men to 
deal with t h i s 
pos i t ion and 
pressing on to May 
with the barrage. 
He chose to keep 
his men moving, 
"leaving enemy 
beh ind in slit 
trenches and dug-
outs who later on were to fire on us to our 
cost."19 
Campbell's men advanced towards the 
eastern edge of May and informed battalion 
headquarters that they had reached their 
objective.20 The artillery continued to pound 
the village with some shells falling short on the 
men waiting on the sloping field. According to 
Lieutenant Morgandeen, the company stayed 
in that position "only about fifteen minutes." 
He told the Historical Officer, who interviewed 
him four days after the battle, that "light was 
breaking and our artillery remained on the 
objective. There was no area between the 
position we had reached and our final 
consolidation position where we might have 
set up a proper defensive area. Hence we came 
back and took up position to the right [east] of 
St. Martin."21 
Campbell's men were immediately pinned 
down by the enemy force they had bypassed 
during their advance. Heavy mortaring kept 
49 
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The church at St. Martin-de-Fontenay is in the centre of the photograph. Verrieres Ridge is in the distance. 
(Photo taken in 1946). (PMR 90-411) 
the men in their slit trenches and Campbell, 
who had lost his wireless link, was not able to 
get a m e s s a g e t h r o u g h to ba t t a l i on 
headquarters to inform MacLaughlan of their 
withdrawal from May.22 MacLaughlan, Megill, 
Foulkes and Simonds all believed that Able 
company was on its objective. 
Baker company was to advance on Able 
company's right flank. They met machine-gun 
fire the moment the start line was crossed. Fire 
from a German outpost at the checkline, the 
sunken Verrieres road, dispersed the company 
and the commanding officer Major C.C. Nixon 
was killed. The company continued south "on 
a magnetic bearing of 197 degrees" but two of 
the platoons were forced to the ground "after 
meeting enfilade fire from eight machine guns 
in St. Martin." The third platoon, commanded 
by Lieutenant John Moffat, was on the left 
flank and continued south, arriving at a 
50 
"waterhole on the eastern edge of May-sur-
Orne. The village was still being shelled by 
Allied artillery "which came in so low" the men 
had "to take shelter from it in dead ground."23 
When the barrage stopped Moffat set off to 
recce the crossroads in May. While he was 
gone it began to get light. Sergeant Wynder 
told the Historical Officer that, "As first light 
came we saw three Tiger tanks and two SP 
guns. Jus t along the south side of the road" 
from May to Fontenay. "When we were spotted 
by them the tanks and SPs tore in behind the 
ramps of a blockhouse and began firing." 
Lieutenant Moffat returned from May and 
decided that "the objective was held by too 
strong a force for 20 men and one PIAT to 
contest." They proceeded "slowly and carefully" 
back towards St. Andre and met men from Able 
company "who told us the rest of our company 
was in the area jus t east of the factory. We 
moved to this area and took up a common front 
6
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in defense with the rest of Baker company 
between 0730 and 0830 hours."24 All of the 
officers except Moffat were now casualties and 
CSM Ralph Wilson and Sergeant Jack Brandon 
were preparing to lead their platoons against 
the German positions in the factory area.25 No 
one contacted battalion headquarters. 
Charlie company, assigned to the area west 
of the main road, ran into opposition "from 
both flanks" from the start line on. "Three men 
of the leading section were killed." Scouts were 
sent forward to "see if we could clear out this 
opposition" but it was "too dark and too difficult 
to clear the enemy out at night." It "was cloudy 
and smoky and so thick we could not see 
anything. "26 The company commander decided 
to wait until morning. As dawn broke Charlie 
moved towards May. They "advanced in single 
file up the ditches on either side of the road to 
the factory area. There, as before, were some 
snipers and also some groups of men who 
wanted to surrender." The advance continued 
using the lefthand ditch which was very deep. 
The lead platoon, under Lieutenant Orville 
Mageli, was within 200 yards of May when 
Major Sherwin Robinson called an Orders 
Group. He knew that "men had been in May-
sur-Orne without meeting any fire, notably the 
signals sergeant"27 who had twice entered the 
village in an attempt to lay a cable to A 
company.28 
It was now 0900 and Robinson ordered 
Charlie company to clear the buildings on both 
sides of the road "right up close to the church." 
They "found no one." At this point snipers to 
the rear of the church and from the right began 
to fire on Mageli's platoon. Over on the left 13 
platoon had "worked up in extended order to 
Looking back to St. Martinfrom the north edge ofMay-sur-Orne, the mine tower in the "factory" area is clearly 
visible as is the church in St. Martin. Point 67 may be seen in the background. (Photo taken in 1946). 
(PMR 90-412) 
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the houses. There were many snipers in the 
orchards to the east of the houses and the 
platoon had a sticky time. About the same time 
we came under fire of what seemed to be our 
own artillery."29 This new hazard was in fact 
the barrage intended to lead the Black Watch 
from May to Fontenay. Charlie company, 
which knew nothing about this plan, took 
cover in the ditches along both sides of the road 
and remained there throughout the Black 
Watch attack. 
The two platoons of the Calgary's reserve 
company that did arrive at the forming up 
place improvised a company headquarters and 
set off behind Baker company. The situation 
quickly became confused. One platoon became 
involved in a fire fight with four light machine 
guns located in an orchard just south of the 
start line. Lieutenant E.A. Michon, who 
commanded the other platoon, learned that 
the acting CO had been wounded and went 
forward to take command. Michon led the 
company "straight down the wheat fields" to 
what he thought was the east side of May-sur-
Orne. The men took up positions around a 
church which turned out to be in St. Martin not 
May.30 
Lieutenant Michon told the Historical Officer 
that "in the confusion of the night and the 
battle, I lost my sense of time and space. . . ." 
With daybreak Michon, still convinced he was 
in May, organized his men to systematically 
clear the eastern part of the village. "We took 
many prisoners there and on our way through 
the eastern edges of the factory district. While 
there I met a 'B' Coy FOO (Artillery Forward 
Observation officer) who also thought we were 
in May-sur-Orne." Michon did not learn where 
he really was until the Black Watch arrived in 
the area shortly after 0700.31 
The Calgary attack on May had yielded close 
to a hundred prisoners and inflicted other 
casualties, but their obj ective was still in enemy 
hands. The forming-up area for the Black 
Watch, not to mention their intended start line, 
was still dominated by German mortar and 
machine-gun fire. This situation was the result 
of the failure to recognize that St. Martin and 
its factory area were well organized, strongly 
held, defensive positions. The first phase of 
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"Spring" should have been an attack on St. 
Martin, not May-sur-Orne. 
Given the difficulty of their task, the Calgaries 
had shown initiative and determination, and 
some skill in the art of mounting a night attack. 
Today, military training manuals emphasize 
what is called C3, command, control and 
communications, as the key to successful 
operations. Apart from the jargon, the concept 
appears obvious to veterans of the Fifth Brigade. 
The difficulty is that command and control are 
not possible without communication and in 
1944 infantry companies frequently lost touch 
with their battalion headquarters and each 
other. Quite apart from casualties to platoon 
and company signals sections, the back-packed 
No. 18 set was subject to interference and 
frequent failure. The Calgaries do not seem to 
have paid enough attention to providing back-
up for wireless communication. MacLaughlan 
and Megill were left to guess at what had 
happened to the four Calgary companies. 
During the three hours of darkness and 
confusion the failure to send runners to report 
to battalion headquarters was understandable, 
but between 0700 and 0900 hours, when the 
Black Watch were preparing their attack, only 
the reserve company made contact with 
MacLaughlan.32 
Phase II of "Spring" was scheduled to begin at first light with the Royal Regiment of 
Canada seizing Rocquancourt and the Black 
Watch advancing from May to cap ture 
Fontenay-le-Marmion. These attacks were to 
take place in conjunction with an advance by 
7th Armoured Division attacking between the 
Canadian brigades to capture the high ground 
near the village of Cranmesnil. 
The Black Watch left the area north of Beauvoir 
farm at 0330 hours and moved in a long, snaking 
column along the road to St. Andre. A few 
casualties were inflicted by machine gun fire but 
it was not until the lead companies turned south 
towards their planned assembly area near the 
church in St. Martin that real resistance was met.33 
St. Martin was far from clear of the enemy. Along the 
east edge of the build-up area there were "high walls 
and hedgessurrounding orchards. Next to these 
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were three or four knocked-out Panther tanks." 
34
 The whole area was studded with machine 
gun and sniper posts with "weapon slits outside 
the walls and hedges and dug-outs and scurry 
holes inside." 35 The artificial moonlight did 
nothing to help locate these positions and in 
the darkness everyone was aware that valuable 
time was slipping away. Jus t as some degree 
of control was established, an undetected enemy 
post opened fire on the battalion's command 
group, mortally wounding Lieut.-Colonel Stuart 
Cantlie and injuring Major Eric Modzfeldt, the 
senior company commander. It was now almost 
0530 hours and the first faint light of dawn was 
visible on the horizon. Most of the battalion 
was still strung out along the hedgerow leading 
to St. Martin, instead of at the start line for the 
attack on Fontenay. 
Command of the battalion passed to the 
senior surviving company commander, a tall, 
slim, twenty-four-year-old, Major Phillip 
Griffin.36 He faced a daunting task. His fellow 
officer, Major Edwin Bennett, recalled the 
moment of crisis in an interview recorded just 
five days after the battle: 
Major Griffin's problem was tha t the battalion was ra ther 
extended. The companies were still intact and under good 
control b u t the th rea t of dispersion and of possible 
confusion was near . Light was breaking and we were 
unde r fire from the ridge. We had j u s t made contact with 
the t anks in St. Andre-sur-Orne. They had moved into the 
orchard as a ha rbour and had lost two t anks coming 
through the town. Fur thermore it was getting close to H-
hour for the a t tack and the battalion was far from the s tar t 
line. Soon the artillery fire would begin and would be of 
no value. Major Griffin had to make time to liaise with the 
artillery and, if possible, retime their shoot. He had to get 
the t ank commander into the picture and make use of his 
force in any new plans . Before this could be done, he had 
to find ou t t he s i tuat ion in St. Andre-sur-Orne from the 
Camerons of Canada and obtain what reports he could on 
the Calgaries and the si tuation at May-sur-Orne. 
Major Griffin is a brilliant officer of absolutely outs tanding 
courage and ability. His take-over in this strained and 
ticklish si tuat ion was superb. There was no uncertainty 
whatever in his actions. He foresaw only a delay, which 
would at the outside be two hours , while he re-arranged 
timings and obtained essential information. The plan for 
the a t tack would be the same as had been previously set. 
In the meant ime the battalion was to move to St. Andre-
sur-Orne a n d occupy the cross roads there on the Verrieres 
road so tha t the m e n would be less obvious targets for the 
fire from the left flank and so tha t a firm base for 
operations would be available. So complete was his 
St Martin-de-Fontenay and the "factory" (top) and 
May-sur-Orne (bottom). Photo taken on 7 August 1944. 
(LCMSDS) 
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control and so well trained the battalion tha t this was 
done at once and in incredibly good order. All the 
companies were in their new positions within 20 minutes 
of the conclusion of the 'O' Group. Up to this time oui 
casualties, aside from the three serious losses in leadership 
were slight, amount ing to ten or fifteen altogether.37 
Griffin's actions between 0600 and 0930 
hours when the Black Watch attack began, 
cannot be fully reconstructed. What is known 
is that a new artillery fire plan was agreed upon 
and tank support arranged with Major Walter 
Harris, the commander of B squadron, First 
Hussars.38 The artillery plan was simply a 
repetition of the original scheme to lead the 
battalion to Fontenay but Griffin decided to 
move directly to the start line rather than by 
the road to May. He now wanted the tanks to 
protect his right flank rather than the left as in 
the original plan, hoping that the promised 
advance of 7th Armoured Division would fully 
occupy the enemy to the east. At about 0830 
hours Griffin made contact with Lieutenant 
Michon, commanding D company of the 
Calgaries, and asked him to "clear out the 
factory area." Michon "went forward to recce 
to discover very heavy machine-gun fire coming 
from the factory area on the right and from the 
knocked out tanks on the high ground on our 
left." Michon told Griffin that, "this was too 
strong opposition for one company to clear 
without artillery support or smoke. He then 
asked me to go forward to see if the Start Line 
was secure and to send him word as he had no 
informat ion concern ing our forward 
companies."39 The Black Watch start line was 
a road angling out of May-sur-Orne and Michon 
would not agree to recce it for Griffin. He failed 
to contact the other Calgary companies and 
then reported to battalion headquarters . 
MacLaughlan ordered him to "try and get 
forward to the objective." Captain Harrison 
and the missing part of D company had arrived 
but their attempt to "get forward" was stopped 
cold by an intense mortar barrage which caused 
"very heavy casualties."40 
Griffin had sent a patrol to May-sur-Orne 
consisting of his intelligence officer, Lieutenant 
L.R. Duffield, Sergeant Benson and one scout. 
54 
Major F.P. Griffin 
(Black Watch Archives) 
The patrol moved straight down route 162 
"without using the ditches"41 and walked into 
the centre of May-sur-Orne without seeing or 
hea r ing any G e r m a n s or any Calgary 
Highlanders. At the crossroads in the centre of 
the village they turned left towards the road 
which marked the battalion start line. Fifty 
yards before reaching it they were fired on by a 
machine gun and Duffield returned to tell 
Griffin that the Calgaries were not in May and 
that the machine gun would be able to fire into 
the flank of the battalion. Griffin's response 
was to order Duffield to lead a reinforced 
patrol, six men, back to May to "take out" the 
machine gun.42 
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Duffield's patrol was not the only force to 
visit May-sur-Orne that morning. Major Walter 
Harris , commanding the First Hussa r s 
squadron, had listened to divisional and brigade 
orders "to go ahead" with Phase II and had sent 
one of his four troops forward. This troop 
"located some of the Calgary Highlanders in a 
hollow north of May, badly cut up and in need 
of stretcher bearers, ammunition, etc." Leaving 
two tanks to assist the Calgaries, the troop 
proceeded to feel its way cautiously into the 
village. At the main crossroads the lead tank 
was holed by an anti-tank gun and the troop 
withdrew to a hull down position on the north 
edge of the village.43 
Meanwhile Major Griffin was conferring with 
Brigadier Megill, who had learned through the 
gunner radio net that a fire plan, timed for 
0930 hours, had been requested by the Black 
Watch. Megill recalls that Griffin was on the 
verandah of a building on the forward edge of 
St. Martin looking out towards May. There did 
not seem to be any shelling at that time and 
Major Griffin calmly explained his plan and 
pointed it out on the ground. Megill thought it 
looked like "a dicey proposition" and suggested 
that the Black Watch secure May-sur-Orne 
first. According to Megill, Griffin replied that 
they had "patrols into May" and he doubted 
that it was held on "a continuous basis." Griffin 
felt sure that if the Black Watch attack went in, 
then once it had passed its start line the 
Calgary Highlanders could "fill in behind, on 
into May-sur-Orne." Megill accepted this 
assessment and returned to his headquarters.44 
The Black Watch had to move quickly if its 
lead companies were to take full advantage of 
the timed artillery program. Unfortunately the 
Hussars were delayed owing to the narrowness 
of the sunken approach road and when the 
first tanks arrived at the forming-up place the 
Black Watch had already begun to move 
forward.45 The tanks quickly started across 
the open ground, aiming for the gap between 
May and the ridge east of the village. Accurate, 
large-calibre, anti-tank fire struck the lead 
tanks immediately and the others sought dead 
ground. By 1020 hours six tanks had been lost 
and Major Harris wounded. At least one troop 
reported reaching the start line but their tanks 
were then caught in enfilade fire from the 
eastern edge of May.46 
The Black Watch, proudest of regiments, did 
not falter. The men were heavily mortared all 
the way to the start line but kept moving. With 
two companies up and the two other companies 
close behind the regiment walked into the jaws 
of a trap. The Germans with excellent fire 
control had been occupying May in strength 
throughout the battle. They now emerged, 
reinforced by Panzer ba t t l e g roups , 
overwhelming the Black Watch-Hussars 
attack.47 On the ridge to the south and east of 
the village the troops in the main German line 
of resistance, complete with dug-in gun and 
mortar positions and packets of hull down 
tanks with a t tendant Panzer grenadiers, 
watched in awe as the Black Watch moved 
forward. 
55 
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May-sur-Orne (left) and Fontenay-le-Marmion (right). The "factory" south of St. Martin may be seen at the 
top of the photograph. Note the shape of the fields in the centre which correspond to the crest ofVerrieres 
Ridge. The minor road running northeastfrom May was the Black Watch start line. (LCMSDS) 
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Lieut-Colonel Donald MacLaughlan 
(NAC PA 183990) 
Captain John Taylor described the advance 
in a letter to his father dated 15 August 1944: 
To begin with I might say that you need never be ashamed 
of having belonged to the Black Watch . . . We started 
across country at 0900 hours. By then the Jerries were 
thoroughly awake as to what was going on and from the 
start we had trouble from very heavy machine gunning 
from the flanks, mortars and artillery fire. The troops were 
steady as a rock and we kept going. I was the left forward 
company and on my right was B company, then 
commanded by Sergeant Foam, all the officers having 
been knocked out. We overran two strong points, then I 
got hit so I can't be accurate as to the rest of the story but 
I understand they got to the objective.48 
58 
Taylor was wounded before Griffin and 
approximately 60 men crossed the crest of the 
ridge. One survivor, Private Montreuil, reported 
that Captain John Kemp, commanding D 
company, urged Major Griffin to call off the 
attack but Griffin replied "that the orders were 
to attack and that the battalion would therefore 
carry on."49 On top of the ridge the remnant of 
the battalion "ran directly into a strong and 
except ional ly well camouflaged enemy 
position."30 Tanks and self-propelled guns 
were concealed in haystacks and intense close-
range fire forced the men to ground. Griffin, 
who may have been the only officer left, ordered 
a withdrawal -"every man to make his way 
back as best he could." Not more than fifteen 
were able to do so. Griffin's body was later 
found "lying among those of his men."51 
The Black Watch suffered 307 casualties on 
25 July. Five officers and 118 other ranks were 
killed or died of wounds, 101 were wounded 
and of the 83 taken prisoner 21 were wounded. 
As the official historian has noted, "Except for 
the Dieppe operation, there is no other instance 
in the Second World War where a Canadian 
battalion had so many casualties in a single 
day."52 
The battle did not end with the destruction 
of the Black Watch. The brigade message log 
portrays a scene of confused fighting on the 
northern edge of May lasting into the early 
afternoon. At 1615 hours a smokescreen was 
laid across the front and Brigadier Megill 
ordered the Calgaries to withdraw into St. 
Andre. Elsewhere on the Corps front prospects 
were equally dismal. The North Nova Scotia 
Highlanders and Fort Garry Horse had been 
mauled in their operation against Tilly-La-
Campagne and in the centre the brilliant 
success of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in 
capturing Verrieres village could not be followed 
up. The Royal Regiment of Canada and C 
squadron of the First Hussars bypassed 
Verrieres heading for Rocquancourt but they 
ran into a "hurricane of fire" and took heavy 
losses. To their right the 1st Royal Tank Regiment 
encountered accurate long-range fire as soon 
as it moved forward.53 
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This tentative advance by one British 
squadron was not part of 7th Armoured 
Division's planned attack for Simonds had 
cancelled the armoured advance. The 1st 
Royal Tank Regiment was under orders to 
assist the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in 
Verrieres and was not part of a larger 
operation.54 Despite his caution in committing 
the armoured division, Simonds still believed 
that some of the objectives of Phase II could be 
won. At 1730 hours he issued orders to renew 
the offensive. Second Division was to capture 
Rocquancourt and May-sur-Orne and then at 
dawn on the 26th, Fontenay-le-Marmion would 
be attacked.55 The Germans had other ideas 
and throughout the early evening hours pressed 
a series of major counterattacks against Fourth 
Brigade, which made an advance to 
Rocquancourt out of the question.56 There was 
less pressure on the Fifth Brigade front and an 
attack by the Regiment de Maisonneuve 
scheduled for 1900 hours was allowed to go 
ahead though it is difficult to discern what this 
move was supposed to accomplish. 
The Maisonneuves were to advance down 
either side of the road to May, with Major 
Ostiguy leading C company on the right and 
Major Massie's B company advancing via the 
factory area. D company under Captain Robert 
was to set out at H+15 to clear out the woods 
on the right flank and then seize the quarry 
northwest of May. The enemy still occupied 
the factory area in strength and the barrage 
provided by two field and four medium 
regiments was of little assistance. Indeed, 
once past the start line they were fired on from 
St. Andre. Ostiguy's men reached the diagonal 
woods about 400 yards north of May before 
enemy fire made further progress impossible.57 
59 
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At 2034 hours the Maisonneuves reported: 
"Both forward companies pinned down in line 
with factory by MGs along road. It is impossible 
to have artillery engage as target is in our 
rear. "58 Forty-five minutes later, when it became 
clear that German resistance was growing, 
Megill ordered the Maisies to return to St. 
Andre where they were to spend the next four 
days holding the village and attempting to 
secure St. Martin. During the course of 
Operation "Spring" the Maisonneuves suffered 
12 fatal and more than 40 non-fatal casualties. 
The Calgary Highlanders had been ordered 
to withdraw to St. Andre on the evening of 25 
July but the companies were scattered and out 
of touch. Megill relieved Lieut.-Colonel 
MacLaughlan who was exhausted by the day's 
events and Major Vern Stott, the second-in-
command, came forward to re-organize.59Megill 
told Stott to plan the defence of the area and 
this task was quickly accomplished by visiting 
60 
each company and placing it in an all-around 
defensive position. Regrettably, Stott was 
wounded "when a crump of mortar" struck him 
in the shoulder. "During this same period 
Major John Campbell staggered into battalion 
headquarters"60 seriously wounded. Captain 
Ross Ellis took over command. That night the 
Calgaries were sent to join the Black Watch in 
the rear area. They had lost five officers and 
172 other ranks killed, wounded and missing. 
Every company commander who had gone into 
battle the previous night was a casualty.61 
On the morning of 26 July 1944 Fifth Brigade 
began the first day of its second week at the 
front. More than one thousand men, roughly 
one fifth of the total strength of the brigade and 
more than half of its infantry rifle strength, 
were killed, wounded, prisoners of war or 
exhaustion casualties. 
[NAC PA 114507) 
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The battles for May-sur-Orne and Verrieres Ridge were soon to be rationalized as 
operations which had greatly assisted the 
American breakout from St. Lo. But, in the 
immediate aftermath of what had seemed like 
a week of disasters, the senior officers of II 
Canadian Corps were forced to think about the 
events differently. Simonds met with both 
Montgomery and Dempsey to discuss "Spring" 
and then talked with his two divisional 
commanders.62 The British Generals must 
have had some reservations about Simonds' 
conduct of the bat t le , par t icular ly his 
persistence in continuing daylight attacks 
which, like Canadian operations on the last 
day of "Goodwood," had been marked by heavy 
casualties to infantry battalions. Infantry was 
a terribly scarce resource in 21 Army Group 
and it seems unlikely that Montgomery or 
Dempsey would have permitted a British 
general to press such costly operations in the 
way the Canadians had.63 
For Simonds, "Spring" was not a failure of 
command b u t a demons t r a t i on of the 
inadequacies of individual Canadian units.64 
Brigadier D.G.B. Cunn ingham and the 
commanding officers of two of his Ninth Brigade 
battalions were fired for refusing to press the 
attack against Tilly.65 Major-General Keller, 
whom the British had suggested replacing in 
early July,66 was retained in command, perhaps 
because he had followed orders and demanded 
that Cunningham mount a new attack. Major-
General Foulkes was also left in command. 
Foulkes had functioned as little more than an 
observer during the first week of battle. He had 
received an out l ine p lan from Corps 
headquarters and prepared a divisional plan 
wi thou t consu l t ing his b r igad ie r s . 
Communications with the assault troops and 
even with brigade headquarters were poor 
throughout the battles but Foulkes did not go 
forward to discover what was happening. Much 
can be blamed on the fog of war but a divisional 
commander ought to be more than a conduit 
for orders from higher formations. Foulkes 
confined his interventions to orders to "get 
going."67 
Second Division's brigadiers had also failed 
to play a decisive role in the battles of July. 
Brigadier H.A. Young, commanding Sixth 
Brigade, ignored the problems the Camerons 
were having in St. Andre, insisting that the 
start line for Operation "Spring" was secure. 
Young did not go forward to determine the 
situation for himself and does not seem to have 
grasped how difficult it would be to stage a 
night attack under these circumstances. 
Brigadier Megill, who has been much criticized 
for his role in "Spring", did go forward repeatedly 
and did attempt to learn all he could about the 
actual situation. Megill had been appalled by 
the plan for "Spring," which seemed to have 
been prepared by someone who could not read 
a contour map and had never seen the ground.68 
Verrieres Ridge, he believed, ought to have 
been cleared from east to west, not by uphill 
attacks overlooked from three sides. Megill 
had discussed this with Foulkes, after a 7th 
Armoured Division liaison officer had suggested 
that his men did not seriously believe that their 
part in Phase II of "Spring" was possible, Megill 
returned to Foulkes' headquarters where he 
sought assurances that the brigades' left flank 
would be protected by a vigorous British thrust. 
Foulkes told him that 7th Armoured would go 
all-out on the morning of 25 July and Megill 
had to accept this assurance.69 
Once the operation began and his worst 
fears were being confirmed on an hourly basis, 
Megill could not bring himself to intervene. 
When Foulkes ordered the Calgaries to press 
their attack and told the Black Watch that 
speed was essential, Megill simply passed the 
orders on.70 When he learned over the "gunners 
net" that Griffin had arranged an attack for 
0930 hours, Megill wentto see the Black Watch 
commander but did not overrule his decision. 
Later that day Megill learned that Foulkes was 
going to renew the a t t a ck us ing the 
Maisonneuves and leaving them under Sixth 
Brigade command. Foulkes and Brigadier 
Young arrived at Fifth Brigade headquarters to 
organize this venture and Foulkes began the 
discussion by reporting that Simonds was 
"furious at the failure which had occurred."71 
Megill protested the decision to order the 
Maisonneuves into battle and a shouting match 
erupted with Foulkes demanding to know if 
Megill was challenging his orders. The result 
61 
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of all this was not, however, to cancel an ill-
conceived plan but to conduct it under the 
control of Fifth Brigade. 
Megill offered this explanation of his actions 
on 25 July in a 1988 interview: 
It was perfectly clear t ha t the at tack should have been 
called off at a very early stage In the morning. I suggested 
this not later t h a n perhaps 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock. Instead 
the Corps c o m m a n d e r was p ress ing the divisional 
commander and he was pressing us to get on with an 
at tack which we knew was almost hopeless. Under these 
c i rcumstances one does not quit. You do as m u c h as you 
possibly can and hope tha t someone will see the light and 
give you some relief.72 
If Phillip Griffin had lived he would no doubt 
have offered a similar explanation. 
After Operation "Spring" failed and it became 
apparent that the Americans had broken 
through the German defences, Montgomery 
changed his plans again and issued a new 
directive. He noted that six of the ten Panzer 
divisions were concentrated in the open country 
south of Caen, so "further large scale efforts in 
this sector were unlikely to succeed." British 
Second Army was therefore to regroup and 
attack with not less than six divisions on the 
Army's right flank at Caumont. This operation, 
code named "Bluecoat", drew all three British 
armoured divisions to the west, forcing a 
postponement of any armoured thrust east of 
the Orne towards Falaise, but the Germans did 
not know this. 
The Canadian effort at Verrieres Ridge, 
mar red as it was by poor operat ional 
intelligence, communication failures and the 
kind of mistakes inexperienced troops were 
bound to make, was nevertheless a successful 
military operation. The enemy responded to 
"Spring" with co-ordinated counter attacks by 
elements of two Panzer divisions. Their 
attempts to evict the Canadians from Verrieres 
village and St. Andre cost the enemy heavy 
casualties and distracted attention from the 
vital part of the front where an American 
breakthrough turned into the long-awaited 
break out. Operation "Spring" may not have 
been planned as a holding operation but it 
certainly became a very successful one. 
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